The case of a Casper man charged in the death of a UW student will be one of the first “test cases” for a new legal precedent for second-degree murder in Wyoming.
A Wyoming Supreme Court decision in Wilkerson v. Wyoming, handed down on Oct. 31, may have an impact on the state’s case against 20-year-old Dalton Dale Williams. Williams is charged with second-degree murder in the death of UW student Joseph McGowan, 21.
A police affidavit alleges Williams threw a single punch during a fight at a house party, injuring McGowan on Oct. 31–the same day the Court decision was made. McGowan was airlifted to the Medical Center of the Rockies near Denver, where he died from traumatic head injuries around 2 p.m. on Nov. 1.
Williams’ case, with a preliminary hearing set for today at 2:30 p.m. at the Albany County Courthouse Circuit Court, will be one of the first “test cases” for the new legal precedent, said Kyle Ridgeway, who is a part of the legal team representing Wilkerson. Ridgeway, an attorney from Casper, said that in the Williams case, the decision as to what defines second-degree murder in Wyoming will “start to get worked out.”
“I hate to call it a test case, because it involves real people with real consequences, but this will probably become one of the first ones,” Ridgeway said. “The incident could not have happened closer to the decision.”
“(U)nless and until the Supreme Court changes the law,” the decision will have an impact. The state will have a “high bar to get over” with the facts he is aware of in the Williams case.
The court’s decision will likely affect any case under similar circumstances, including the Williams case, said another of Wilkerson’s defense team, Jon Robinson.
Robinson, an attorney from Jackson who made the argument in front of the Supreme Court, said he did not know all the facts of the Laramie case. He said, however, that “unless and until the Supreme Court changes the law,” the decision will have an impact. The state will have a “high bar to get over” with the facts he is aware of in the Williams case.
“It’s the same problem the state will have when they retry Wilkerson,” Robinson said. “How are they going to show the defendant knew the punch would likely result in death? Second-degree murder is reserved for activities more dangerous than a punch to the head. I’m not condoning violence, but people get punched all the time and we don’t expect them to die.”
The defendant in the Supreme Court case, Richard Cameron Wilkerson, 32, was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 20-40 years imprisonment after he threw a single punch which resulted in the death of Brian Newman at the Century Club bar in Buffalo.
Members of Wilkerson’s legal team said they inspired by a University of Wyoming Law Review from 2007. Using an article written by Former Director of the UW College of Law’s Prosecution Clinic Eric A. Johnson, Wilkerson’s legal team successfully argued that the instructions given to the jury provided “a very low threshold of proof for conviction” and failed to require the state to prove “both elements” required to convict a defendant of second-degree murder.
Johnson, now a professor at the University of Illinois College of Law, said the law in Wyoming second-degree murder cases, which had stood in the state for almost 30 years, “did not make sense.” Johnson said the law only required a defendant to perform a “voluntary act” in concert with “some kind of ill will,” resulting in a person’s death.
The case of Wilkerson, where a person delivers a single punch resulting in another person’s death, was exactly the kind of case he critiqued in his law review article.
“Punching someone is a voluntary act and because you usually have ill will when you punch someone, then under the old definition, that would qualify a second-degree murder,” Johnson said. “In the Wilkerson case, the court changed that definition.”
“Malice” required a defendant’s intent in a crime to have “some level of intent to kill.”
Ridgeway said the state’s statute did not provide an adequate definition of “malice” to properly instruct a jury. Ridgeway said “malice” required a defendant’s intent in a crime to have “some level of intent to kill.” In other words, a defendant would have to understand his or her actions could result in death, but disregard that consequence with “extreme indifference.”
“Extreme” component requires the defendant to have a “conscious awareness” that poses an “unjustifiable risk of death.”
The new requirements for second-degree murder, Johnson said, require “extreme” recklessness on the part of the defendant. In criminal law, Johnson said the “extreme” component requires the defendant to have a “conscious awareness” that poses an “unjustifiable risk of death.” This is enough to convict a person of manslaughter.
Recklessness is enough to convict a person of manslaughter in Wyoming, but Johnson said the “extreme” component requires the accused to act transcendent of carelessness, or with a “depraved heart.” Defendants in this instance would have to act with “such extreme recklessness, where there’s a very high risk” and he or she is “consciously aware of that risk,” Johnson said.
“The question now would be,” Johnson said, “‘Is that extreme recklessness present in the case where a person punches another person?'”
Debated at length in Johnson’s law review and the Supreme Court opinion, is the difference between specific intent and general intent in a wrongful death. Self-induced intoxication, or being under the influence of alcohol in the cases of Wilkerson and Williams, play a role in the definition and how it fits or does not fit the requirements for second-degree murder.
For second-degree murder and manslaughter, there is no need to prove the defendant specifically wanted the victim to die, as is required for first-degree murder.
In cases of specific harm, Johnson said the target the government has to hit is whether the defendant intended “social harm.” For second-degree murder and manslaughter, there is no need to prove the defendant specifically wanted the victim to die, as is required for first-degree murder. Extreme recklessness is required for second-degree murder and only recklessness for manslaughter. Ordinary recklessness negates the need to prove the defendant acted with a “depraved heart” or “extreme indifference.”
For intoxication, voluntary self-induced intoxication is only a defense for specific intent crimes.
“If you’re charged with first-degree murder, then you can argue to the jury that your intoxication deprived you of the ability to form the specific intent required,” Johnson said. “If you’re charged with second-degree murder or manslaughter, by contrast, you cannot argue to the jury that hour intoxication deprived of the ability to form the required general intent.”
The affidavit in the Williams case did not indicate what the defendant’s blood alcohol content was during the time of arrest.
Although all legal experts were hesitant to comment on what degree the court’s decision will have on future cases, including Williams’s, there is a consensus the ruling and the outcome in Williams’s case will be connected.
“We think it changes our case,” Ridgeway said. “It changes other cases in that if you have conduct like a punch, we don’t think it would meet the second-degree murder standard anymore. As far as other conduct, it remains to be seen.”
Robinson said Wilkerson was still facing second-degree murder charges. A retrial date in District Court will probably be set in the next 30 days.
“I imagine we will either reach a plea agreement or go to trial again,” Robinson said.
“If we don’t get anything done by December, the county attorney and the negotiations we’ve had with him are gone,” Ridgeway said. “There’s lots of moving parts with what will happen with Richard.”
Ridgeway said time will be a factor in how the defense team proceeds. Johnson County Attorney, Kenneth DeCock, lost his reelection bid this month. Wilkerson’s legal defense had been negotiating with DeCock on their case and his leaving office in January threw “a kink in the gears,” Ridgeway said.
“If we don’t get anything done by December, the county attorney and the negotiations we’ve had with him are gone,” Ridgeway said. “There’s lots of moving parts with what will happen with Richard.”
According to the facts as described in the Court’s opinion, Brian Newman was at the Century Club bar in Buffalo, where he arrived after “consuming several beers at home” and continued to drink beers and shots of Jagermeister on Sept. 21, 2012. Wilkerson arrived around 1 a.m. and sat at a table where Newman joined, uninvited. After an exchange of hostile words, Newman returned to the bar where Wilkerson eventually delivered one punch to Newman, knocking him off his barstool. During the fall, Newman struck his head on the bar ledge. At this point, it is alleged that Wilkerson stomped or kick in the direction of Newman, but there was “no scientific evidence” he connected his foot to Newman, said Ridgeway. Newman’s blood alcohol content was 0.226 percent at the time of death.
McGowan’s death in Williams’s case took place when on Oct. 31 of this year. A fight took place on the front lawn area at 770 N 7th Street. Two individuals began throwing punches, when another individual from the party began walking to the fight and McGowan followed. Though no witnesses report seeing Williams actually hit McGowan, most say they heard the fall and turned to see McGowan lying with his head in the gutter, with his body on the lawn, according to the affidavit written by Commander Miles Cushman of the LPD. Upon arriving at Ivinson Memorial Hospital, Cushman’s report indicates a doctor on duty informed him McGowan had sustained severe trauma to the head and “that McGowan would probably die from his injuries” and if not fatal, his injuries would have left him with “very little function” and “would most likely be in a vegetative state.”
